Power-Efficient Deceptive Wireless Beamforming Against Eavesdroppers

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Beamforming: Array Response

When we have an array of anntennas (Tx/Rx) we may steer the signal to a preferred direction



Relative power of the transmitted signal for different spatial directions.

Eavesdropping & Beamforming



Figure: A transmitter has to face two receivers that eavesdrop (Eve 1 & 3) besides the legitimate receiver (Com 2).

How do we tackle eavesdroppers with Beamforming (1) Array Response with Transmit Beamforming & Nulling

Array response when doing transmit beamforming with an optimization method. Nulling with $\theta_c = 80^\circ$, $\theta_{eav} = \{30^\circ, 50^\circ\}$.



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- Multi-Function RF (MFRF) systems have proposed the joint design of a signal for communications, RADAR, and electronic RF jamming but without considering eavesdropping [TS22].
- Al alternative is to inject deceptive signals that spoof some parameters of the signal emiitted in the direction of the eavesdroppers [Arg23].

Eavesdropping & Beamforming Deception



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- Deception of what?
- Spoofed relative distance and velocity

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- Consider the *i*-th eavesdropper.

$$\mathbf{y}_i = \mathbf{H}_i^{\text{circ}} \mathbf{F}^H \mathbf{x}_i + \mathbf{n}.$$
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For each OFDM symbol, the OFDM receiver at the *i*-th eavesdropper first performs the typical OFDM processing. That is it applies a DFT to the *L* samples of the OFDM symbol in y_i to obtain the frequency-domain (FD) signal:

$$\tilde{\mathbf{y}}_i = \mathbf{F} \mathbf{y}_i = \mathbf{F} \mathbf{H}_i^{\text{circ}} \mathbf{F}^{\text{H}} \mathbf{x}_i + \tilde{\mathbf{n}} = \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i \mathbf{x}_i + \tilde{\mathbf{n}}.$$
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- The ℓ -th entry in the vector $\mathbf{x}_{e,i}$ indicates the symbol that is transmitted in the ℓ -th subcarrier.

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- The ℓ -th entry in the vector $\mathbf{x}_{e,i}$ indicates the symbol that is transmitted in the ℓ -th subcarrier.
- ▶ If f_{ℓ} is the frequency of the ℓ -th subcarrier we populate this matrix as:

$$[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{\rm sp}]_{\ell,\ell} = \exp(-j2\pi f_\ell \frac{R_{\rm sp}}{c}) \exp(j2\pi f_{\rm sp} m T_L).$$
(4)

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Optimization Problem

- $A(\theta_e), A(\theta_c)$ contain the steering vectors towards the eavesdroppers and comms receivers respectively.
- ▶ The deceptive wireless beamforming (DWB) problem is:

$$\min_{\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{X}_e} \mathbf{s}^{\mathsf{H}} \mathbf{s} \quad \text{s.t.} \ \mathbf{A}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_e) \mathbf{S} = \mathbf{F}^{\mathsf{H}} \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{\mathsf{sp}} \mathbf{X}_e \tag{5}$$
$$\mathbf{A}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_e) \mathbf{S} = \mathbf{D}_e.$$

- ▶ The first constraint states that the OFDM signal can consist of any combination of valid QAM symbols X_e that will be spoofed with \tilde{H}_{sp} and fed into the IDFT F^H to produce a deceiving OFDM symbol.
- ▶ The second constraint corresponds is an under-determined system of linear equations (when $N_T > N_c$).

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Simulations

- Uniform Linear Array of N_T elements
- We consider the Tx and various combinations of wireless receivers (eavedropping and com- munication) that were uniformly distributed at random spatial directions in the range [0,180] degrees, and random distances in the range of [1,100] meters.
- We present average power consumption results at the Tx for 1000 random topology configurations using 64-QAM

Results - Beampattern



Figure: Array responses for the nulling techniques in (a), (b), and DWB (c).

Results - Transmit Power (1)



Results - Transmit Power (2)



Results - Transmit Power (3)



(c) $N_e = 4$ and different N_c and SNR.

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- DWB deceives the eavesdroppers in terms of range and Doppler (velocity) instead of nulling the signal towards them.
- The beamformer is designed by solving a relaxed QP.
- Simulation results indicate that DWB can lead to a beamformer design that achieves very low transmission power, preserves the beam shape, and ensures the privacy of two location parameters of the Tx.

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